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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
The extension of the period of "lives in being" by the addition
of twenty-one years does not seem to have the same foundation of
reasonableness to recommend it, and could very well be discarded.
The extirpation of sections forty-three and forty-five, and the al-
teration proposed for section forty-six are, of course, necessary,
they being adjunctive sections to section forty-two in that they
carry out the scheme introduced by the Revisers to limit the sus-
pension to two lives in being. The recommended change in the
Personal Property Law would have the effect of placing trusts of
personal property on a par with those of real property. Such a
change would be in accord with recent enactments seeking uni-
formity in the disposltion of estates of decedents. 19
BERNARD E. DOCHERTY.
PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION TO DETERMINE COMPETENCY OF
CONFESSION AS EViDENCE.-"The law sedulously guards against the
introduction of irrelevant or incompetent evidence, by which the
rights of a party may be prejudiced." 1 The reason for this is not
difficult of comprehension. A litigant may reasonably demand that
a Court or jury determine the merits of his action, after hearing
only that evidence which is germane to the issue. Testimony which
is irrelevant, or worse, incompetent, serves no useful purpose at a
trial. Too often does but the mere allusion to testimony, which the
Court declares incompetent, create an impression on the minds of
the jurors which will react prejudicially against a litigant. Inevi-
tably the infusion of prejudice tends to deprive him of the fair and
impartial trial which the law accords all litigants. With unfailing
diligence our Courts must observe and follow "the meticulous rules
of evidence by which it is designed to have a case determined only
on first hand evidence bearing exclusively and directly on the issues
involved." 2
While it is stated generally that the rules with regard to the
admission of evidence are to be applied in civil and criminal cases,
alike, yet in criminal cases the necessity always exists for a more
rigid enforcement of these rules. 3 Professor Wigmore has stated
that:
"In criminal charges, the higher degree of caution al-
ways exercised by the law in favor of the accused prompts
to a greater strictness in excluding suspicious testimony." 4
"N. Y. Decedent Estate Law (1930).
'Williams v. Brooklyn Elevated Railroad Co., 126 N. Y. 96, 103, 26 N.
E. 1048, 1049 (1891).2 (1930) 4 St. John's L. Rev. 192.
'Wharton. Criminal Evidence (10th ed. 1912), p. 47, Sec. 24b.
'2 Wigmore, Evidence (2nd ed. 1923), p. 140, Sec. 822.
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A specie of evidence, the admissibility of which has caused
much perplexion, is the confession. "A confession, as applied in
criminal law, is a statement by a person, made at any time after-
wards, that he committed or participated in the commission of a
crime." " There can be no stronger link in the chain of evidence
against one accused of crime than his own "acknowledgment in ex-
press words of the truth of the accusation against him." With the
ultimate conclusion reached by Professor Wigmore, that "a free
and voluntary confession is deserving of the highest credit, because
it is presumed to flow from the strongest sense of guilt, and, there-
fore, it is admitted as proof of the crime to which it refers" 6 one
can not cavil. Unquestionably, when a confession is freely and
voluntarily made, it is surrounded by the cloak of truthfulness and
trustworthiness with which all evidence must be gowned, and as
such it is most competent testimony. The rule, conceived at the
common law, and adopted in New York, by statute 7 is now firmly
established that a free and voluntary confession, whether made be-
fore or after apprehension, and whether in writing or in unwritten
words, is admissible when offered against the accused, no matter
where or to whom it was made.
The difficulty lies in the determination of the question of whether
a confession offered at the trial has been freely and voluntarily
made by the defendant. With annoying frequency, trial and Ap-
pellate Courts are called to rule upon the competency of confes-
sions because the claim is made by the defendant that the purported
"confession" was extorted from him by force and violence. Ex-
perience has verified the disturbing truth that frequent resort is had
to the third degree in order to force a confession from an accused.
"One is driven to the conclusion that the third degree is employed
as a matter of course in most states, and has become a recognized
step in the process that begins with arrest dnd ends with acquittal
or final affirmance." 8 Arresting officers and prosecuting attorneys
too often assume--contrary to the law-that it is within their power
to institute a summary inquisition, and to extort from the party
suspected a statement that would confirm their suspicions. This is
indeed a sad commentary and an unpardonable indictment against
the law enforcing authorities, of our country,9 especially when one
'Wharton, supra note 3 at 1265, Sec. 622.
'2 Wigmore, supra note 4 at p. 141, Sec. 822 (Italics ours).
N. Y. Code of Criminal Procedure. Sec. 395.
'Note (1930) 43 -arv. L. Rev. 617.
' In Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383. 392, 34 Sup. Ct. 341, 344
(1914), the United States Supreme Court said: "The tendency of those who
execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain conviction by means of
unlawful seizures, and enforced confessions, the latter often obtained after sub-jecting accused persons to unwarranted practices destructive of rights secured
by the Federal Constitution, should find no sanction in the judgments of the
courts which are charged at all times with the support of the Constitution
and to which people of all conditions have a right to appeal for the main-
tenance of such fundamental rights."
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contrasts "the practice in England where not one case showing evi-
dence of third degree methods has been found in the past twenty
years," 10 with that prevalent here, where this pernicious system has
become so firmly entrenched that "a confession is adduced in prac-
tically every case where an indictment is found." , These facts
assume a more appalling hue when it is borne in mind that it is
mostly the members of the "lower classes" that are exposed to the
iniquity of the third degree, for, as Dean Pound observes: "no
rich man has been subjected to the third degree to obtain proof of
violation of anti-trust or anti-rebate legislation, and no powerful
politician has been so dealt with in order to obtain proof of bribery
or graft." 12
There is indeed ample ground for the distrust attached to con-
fession testimony. This is a distrust based on experience. Can
one reasonably attach any trustworthiness to a purported confession
of an accused when the impelling motive to confess is supplied by
a rubber hose, or a boxing glove in the hand of an officer? 13 What
trustworthiness may be attributed to the expressions of a mind that
has been subjected to endless hours of "inquisitorial compulsion"? 14
A confession thus obtained is denuded of that element with which
all testimony must be vested, to wit, trustworthiness.
'There is no rule more firmly established in the law of evidence,
than that which declares incompetent, and thus inadmissible, any
confession obtained by or made under the influence of threats or
violence.' 5 A confession forced from the mind by the torture of
fear, comes in so questionable a shape when it is to be considered
as evidence of guilt, that no credit ought to be given to it, and,
therefore, it is rejected as incompetent.
This rule is too well settled, to any longer perturb trial or Ap-
pellate Courts. However, it is the proper determination of the
concomitant questions of the procedure to be followed in cases where
confessions are involved, that is the source of much judicial ex-
pression.
Digressing momentarily from the immediate subject matter,
attention is called to several generally acknowledged rules of the
law of evidence relative to the admissibility of competent testimony.
It is exclusively within the Court's province to determine whether,
oSupra note 8 at 618.
" Wharton, stpra note 3 at 1290, Sec. 622f.
12 Pound, The Spirit of the Common Law (1921), p. 105.
People v. Doran, 246 N. Y. 409, 159 N. E. 379 (1927).
"People v. Kennedy, 159 N. Y. 346, 362, 54 N. E, 51, 56 (1899). An
example of this "inquisitorial compulsion" is related in. the N. Y. World-Tele-
gram of March 17, 1931. "Exasperated officials who, for twenty-four hours,
had bullied, implored and ranted without moving Mrs. from
her phlegmatic.attitude of innocence, this afternoon arrested her on the charge
that she had murdered her husband."
"Supra note 7; 16 C. J., p. 728 and cases therein cited.
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as a matter of law, testimony offered of a fact is competent as evi-
dence. The Court having determined its competency, which de-
termination is necessarily preliminary to admissibility, it is then
within the jury's province to evaluate this evidence.
These same principles generally prevail in the procedure on the
admission of confessions. The voluntary or involuntary character
of a confession is a question of law, to be determined by the trial
Judge, from the facts, as a condition precedent to the admission of
the confession.16 The Court has the duty to determine as a matter
of law, prior to permitting the confession to go to the jury, whether
it was or was not voluntary. 17
To aid a trial Court in properly deciding the question of ad-
missibility of a confession and to maintain inviolate the right of a
defendant to a fair and impartial trial, his guilt or innocence to be
determined by the jury after hearing only conmpetent evidence offered
against him, the following rule of procedure has been devolved:
"Where a confession of guilt is offered against a person
on trial for a criminal offense, and he objects to the same
and offers to prove to the court that it was procured from
him by threats or promises, or under such circumstances as
would render it incompetent as evidence, it is error to re-
ceive it, without first hearing the proof offered and deciding
upon the competency of the confession as evidence against
the party making it." 18
This has become the established procedure in our criminal
courts. 19 The Court of Appeals recently reasserted the rule when
Judge Crane wrote that:
"When the point in the trial was reached at which the
prosecution sought to introduce the confession, the learned
trial justice * * * in accordance with our procedure took
testimony both for the prosecution and for the defense upon
the question of whether or not the confession was voluntary
or was the outcome of fear and violence." 20
People v. Rogers, 192 N. Y. 331, 85 N. E. 135 (1908); People v.
Brasch, 193 N. Y. 46, 85 N. E. 809 (1908) ; People v. Doran, supra note 13;
People v. Weiner, 248 N. Y. 118, 161 N. E. 441 (1928 ; People v. Barbato,
254 N. Y. 170, 172 N. E. 458 (1930).
16 C. J., p. 735.
People v. Fox, 121 N. Y. 449, 453, 24 N. E. 923, 924 (1890).
People v. Rogers, supra note 16; People v. Brascb, supra note 16; People
v. Randazzio, 194 N. Y. 147, 87 N. E. 112 (1909); People v. Nunziato, 233
N. Y. 394, 135 N. E. 827 (1922); People v. Doran, supra note 13; People v.
Barbato, supra note 16.
People v. Doran, supra note 13 at 415, 159 N. E. at 381.
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Our Appellate Courts countenance no digression from this
established rule. It is error to deny the defendant's request to offer
his testimony on the involuntary character of the confession, prior
to its reception.
2 1
"The reason for the rule which requires that the de-
fendant shall be given full opportunity before testimony of
alleged confessions is given to show that the same were in-
voluntary and made under the influence of fear produced by
threats, is to avoid the possibility of a jury hearing such
alleged confessions which may subsequently appear to be in-
admissible. To avoid the possibility that a jury may be
unconsciously influenced by alleged confessions admitted in
the evidence and afterwards stricken out as inadmissible re-
quires that the defendant's right to said preliminary exam-
inations should be rigidly enforced whenever by any reason-
able possibility the confessions may be inadmissible under
Section 395 of the Code of Criminal Procedure." 22
If no objection is made to its admission, then the presumption
is, that the confession is voluntary. Where there is no dispute as
to the circumstances under which the confession was made, the
trial Judge may determine, as a matter of law, that it was volun-
tarily or involuntarily made. "The court should reject the confes-
sion, if a verdict that it was made freely would be against the weight
of the evidence. * * * But, upon disputed facts, the voluntariness
is, under proper instruction of the court, for the jury." 23 The
Court passes upon the facts merely for the purpose of determining
their competency and admissibility. The jury passes upon the same
facts, and in connection with other facts in determining whether
the confession is true and entitled to any, and how much weight.
The Court and jury each have a well defined and separate province.
While these rules aim to, and to a marked extent do, preserve
to a defendant his right to have the jury determine his case after
hearing only competent testimony, still, we may reasonably inquire,
do the rules fully achieve their purpose in practice? Can we rea-
sonably say that a jury is not "unconsciously influenced" by the fact
that the defendant has "confessed," after it listens to testimony
People v. Fox, .npra note 18; People v. Doran, supra note 13; People
v. Nunziato, su~pra note 19.
'People v. Farmer, 194 N. Y. 251, 269 87 N. E. 457, 464 (1909). (Italics
ours.)
Richardson, The Law of Evidence (3rd ed. 1928), pp. 272, 273. In the
Doran case, supra note 13, the Court at 416; 159 N. E. at 381, said, "when
upon this preliminary examination an issue of fact is raised by conflicting
testimony, the confession may be admitted, and the question left to the jury
whether it was the voluntary statement of the defendant. If not, they must
disregard the confession and throw it out as no evidence."
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both of the prosecution and the defense as to the voluntariness of
the confession, even should the Court ultimately rule that the con-
fession, having been extorted by force or threats is incompetent
and inadmissible? Has not the defendant's right to a fair and im-
partial trial based exclusively on competent testimony been impaired
and prejudiced, when a prosecuting attorney is permitted to tell
the jury in his opening address that the defendant has confessed,
when it may be decided by the Court at the trial, that as a matter
of law, there has been no voluntary confession, and thus any tes-
timony pertaining to it is incompetent and inadmissible? We sub-
mit that the practice of permitting the jury to listen to testimony
of the making of a confession, where the confession itself will be
rejected, is, inevitably, unduly prejudicial to a defendant. The
jurors might be told to disregard and forget the testimony but how
can one be certain that they will disregard it, and that they will
not be unconsciously influenced after hearing it? Nothing must be
introduced in evidence to divert the jury from the exercise of its
sound and dispassionate judgment.
With a view to the elimination of the shortcomings in the pro-
cedure herein discussed, a proposed amendment to section 395 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure in relation to the use of confes-
sions as evidence, was introduced at the present session of the New
York Legislature. 24  The proposed amendment provides that
"Where a defendant claims on arraignment in any court
that a confession has been obtained against him under the
influence of fear produced by threats or violence, it shall be
the duty of the court, judge or magistrate to order an im-
mediate investigation, and if it shall appear after such in-
vestigation, that such confession was obtained through
threats or violence it shall be excluded and shall not be com-
petent evidence in any court wherein the same may be offered
against the defendant."
The effect of this amendment marks a progressive step in se-
curing for a defendant his right to a fair and impartial trial. It is
true that our Court of Appeals has refused to sanction the prac-
tice of permitting a trial Judge to hear evidence of the manner in
which a confession was obtained so as to determine the preliminary
question of its competency, without the presence of the jury,2 5 still
the proposed procedure is neither lacking in authority nor merit.26
" Senate Bill No. 503, introduced February 3, 1931, and referred to the
Committee on Codes.
People v. Brasch, supra note 16; People v. Randazzio, supra note 19.
Professor Wigmore suggests that "the jury, during the hearing of this
evidence (of voluntariness of confession) may be withdraum as is proper dur-
ing all proof and arguments upon questions of admissibility." (Italics ours.)
2 Wigmore, supra note 4 at p. 219; See also Wharton, supra note 3 at pp.
1294, 1295.
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Would it not be more consonant with fairness and humaneness and
the proper security of a defendant's rights and liberty, to have a
Court or Magistrate investigate, on the defendant's arraignment
whether a confession was extracted from him by force or threats?
Any marks of maltreatment on a defendant will be more apparent
on the day of his arraignment than at his trial. Grant to the Judge
or Magistrate presiding at the arraignment the duty to determine
the voluntary nature of a confession, and an opportunity will thereby
be given to the defendant of presenting to the Court any of the
mute, but most eloquent testimony that he may offer in the form of
battered features, echymoses, scars or abrasions. Should the Court
at this preliminary hearing determine that the confession was forced
from the defendant then "it shall be excluded and shall not be
competent evidence in any court wherein the same may be offered
against the defendant." Should the Court determine that the con-
fession was not forced, and thus admissible, the same evidence and
all other circumstances affecting the weight of the confession would
then be introduced at the trial for the jury's ultimate consideration.
The dual safeguard granted to a defendant under the pro-
posed amendment is grounded on indispensable elements of justice.
A preliminary examination made at the arraignment, when livid
bruises may proclaim the involuntary nature of the "confession,"
will unquestionably aid the Court in more properly determining its
competency, and may in cases where the confession is the crux of
the prosecution's case, save a defendant the indignity and irreparable
injustice of an unsustained conviction. 27
Justice and reason dictate that the security of personal liberty
and the continued assurance of a fair and impartial trial determined
exclusively on proper and competent evidence, will be more effectu-
ally protected if the proposed amendment in relation to preliminary
examinations to determine the competency of confessions as evidence,
be enacted as law.
FRANK COMPOSTO.
- No more striking example of the injustice that may be inflicted upon
defendants by forced confessions can be found than in the Weiner and Bar-
bato cases, supra note 16, where, after the jury had received, as evidence, con-
fessions which the defendants claimed were extorted from them, convicted
the defendants of murder. The Court of Appeals subsequently reversed their
convictions on the grounds that it so palpably appeared that the confessions
were involuntary that as a matter of law the trial Court should have ex-
cluded them. The prosecutors, being deprived of the use of the "confessions"
by the opinions of the Court of Appeals never retried these defendants who
had languished in jail for months, but released them on their own recognizance.
